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STUDENT NOTES
REMEDIES AND DAMAGES FOR FRAUDULENT MISREPRESEN-
TATION IN KENTUCKY
While fraud has been said by the Kentucky Court to be" a
generic term which embraces all the multifarious means which
human ingenuity can devise and are resorted to by one individual to
get advantage over another .. .,"' fraudulent misrepresentation is a
much narrower term. "The gist of actionable fraud by misrepresenta-
tion is the producing of a false impression upon the mind of the
other party with respect to a fact " It is not the purpose of this
note to deal with the problem of what acts or statements are suffi-
cient to create such an impression but rather with the remedies and
damages which have been afforded under the Kentucky cases to one
who has relied on fraudulent representations to his detriment.
Let us take the typical situation: A fraudulently misrepresents
the quality of goods or land to B, which B purchases in reliance
thereon. Upon discovery of the fraud which has been practiced upon
him, B may take the following courses:I
(1) Bring an action to rescind the contract. This is an equitable
action in which the party defrauded tenders back that which he has
received under the contract,' and seeks to regain that with which he
has parted.' The object of this remedy is to place the parties in
status quo, hence it is only available to one who can return the con-
sideration received.
(2) Interpose fraud as a defense to an action brought on the con-
tract.' This is a defensive measure in which the victim of the fraud
does nothing until the other party attempts to enforce the contract,
which effort is then opposed by the defense of fraud. Such action
would be desirable only when B has further obligations to perform
and can get nothing from A.
(3) Counterclaim for damages in an action brought by A on the
contract.' Here as above the victim takes no offensive move until
'Commonwealth v. Smith, 242 Ky. 365, 372, 46 S.W 2d 474, 478
(1932)
Curd v. Bethell, 248 Ky. 127, 130, 58 S.W 2d 261, 263 (1932).
'Notp that one through four of the following classification are
substantially similar to those provided by the Uniform Sales Act for
an action for breach of warranty. Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 361.690.
'An exception to the rule that for a rescission there must be a
tender back is where one is fraudulently induced to accept a less
amount than a sum certain to which he is entitled. Fox v. Hudson's
Ex'x., 150 Ky. 115, 150 S.W 49 (1912).
'Barrowman Coal Corp. v. Kentland Coal & Coke Co., 302 Ky.
803, 196 S.W 2d 428 (1946), Kentucky Electric Development Com-
pany's Rec. v Head, 252 Ky 656, 68 S.W 2d 1 (1934).
*Anderson v. Tway, 143 F 2d 95 (1944).
'Nunn v. Howard, 216 Ky. 685, 288 S.W 678 (1926), Ades v
J. T. and Mary E. Wash, 199 Ky 687, 251 S.W 970 (1923)
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attacked, when he affirms the contract and seeks damages for the
fraud practiced on him.
(4) Affirm the contract and sue for damages.! Having discovered
the fraud the party here elects to carry out the contract and have
compensation in the form of damages whereupon he brings an action
without waiting for any act on the part of A.
(5) Enjoin a judgment secured by A. Only one case has been
found involving such a remedy m Kentucky In Stone v. Ramsey' the
plaintiff entered into a contract in which he claimed there was fraud.
The defendant had secured a judgment which the plaintiff sought to
enjoin. While holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
the allegation of fraud the court by way of dicta indicated the avail-
ability of this remedy if there had been a tender back.
(6) Estop A from denying the truth of his representations. This
remedy, as that of injunction, is limited in application. It would be
available only where A has represented that he would undertake to
perform some act which he subsequently denies.'"
The election from the above remedies will, of course, depend
upon the circumstances of the case and the extent to which the con-
tract has been performed. If the consideration has already passed to
A, B will of necessity adopt one of the offensive rather than one of
the defensive remedies available. If A's financial condition is pre-
carious, B would probably elect to rescind rather than to affirm the
contract. Usually if no consideration has passed and A is insolvent,
B will not elect to affirm the contract.
The example set forth above involves a contract between the
person making the false representation and the person injured there-
by. Such, however, is not always the case, e.g., A by fraudulent rep-
resentations may induce B to enter into a contract with C. Under the
doctrine of Pasley v. Freeman," B is entitled to recover although
there is no privity of contract. It was this English case which estab-
lished deceit as a distinct and separate action from the action for
breach of warranty. A common instance in which a contract is en-
tered into in reliance upon the fraudulent representations of a third
party is where a director misrepresents the condition of a corpora-
tion in which he is an officer.'2 An interesting case allowing a re-
covery without a contract is that of Graham v. John R. Watts and
Son'" wherein the defendant manufacturing company packaged and
'Shilling v. McCraw 298 Ky 783, 184 S.W 2d 97 (1944) Sellars
v. Adams, 190 Ky. 723, 228 S.W 424 (1921), Bacon v Brown, 7 Ky
(4 Bibb) 91 (1815).
*20 Ky. (4 T. B. Mon.) 236 (1827).
"Furst & Thomas v. Smith, 280 Ky. 601, 133 S.W 2d 941 (1939).
13 T. R. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (1789)
'"Dennison v Thompson, 240 Ky. 727, 43 S.W 2d 18 (1931) Pul-
liam v. Gentry, 206 Ky 763, 268 S.W 557 (1925)- Ligon v. Minton,
125 S.W 304 (Ky. 1910), Trimble v. Reid, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 604, 41
S.W 304 (1897).
"238 Ky. 96, 100-106, 36 S.W 2d 859, 861-863 (1931).
L. J.-4
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mislabeled a bag of seed which the plaintiff bought from a retailer
in reliance thereon. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to
maintain an action for fraudulent misrepresentation on the ground
that the representation was made to the general public. In all such
cases the only remedy against the person making the misrepresenta-
tion is one for damages as there is no contract between the parties to
the suit.
The second problem for discussion in this note concerns the
damages to be awarded one who has elected to affirm the contract.
Two views as to the measure of damages to be applied mn such a case
have been advanced.
The first of these is the loss-of-bargain rule which is, according
to Prosser, the majority rule.' The measure here is the difference
between the value represented and the value received. The reasoning
of the courts following this rule is that the person duped into the
transaction had a right to expect a profit therefrom and should not
be deprived of it by the fraud of the wrong-doer." This is an appli-
cation of the contract rule of damages to a tort action where a con-
tract is involved, but as stated before not always with the person
making the misstatement. The application of this rule is easily justi-
fied in cases where there is a contract between the parties as it
merely applies familiar contract rules and even in those other cases
where fraudulent representations are made with actual intent re-
covery is justified on the theory that the intentional wrongdoer as
liable for all the consequence of his act. But in cases where there is
something less than actual intent, which is an reality nothing more
than a negligent misrepresentation, and there is no contract, the ap-
plication of the loss-of-bargain rule is more difficult to sustain.
The courts adhering to the out-of-pocket rule, which is that the
measure of damagps is the difference between the contract price and
the value received, proceed upon the theory that the action is one
in tort and that the plaintiff is entitled only to compensation for
"actual" harm done him by the acts of the defendant. When con-
fronted by the argument that there is a contract entered into an re-
liance on the misrepresentations and the party will suffer the loss of
his profit from such contract, their response is that the action is not
brought on the contract but on the tort and the tort rule governs."
In Kentucky but one case has been found in which the question
as to the proper rule for damages has been squarely presented. In
Drake v. Holbrook'7 the defendant represented that the debts of a
corporation in which he was half stockholder were much less than
they actually were. The stock was worth the price paid by the plain-
tiff but had the representations been true its value would have been
increased. In reversing the decision for the defendant and remanding
"PROSSER, TORTS 768 (1941).
"PRO SSER, TORTS 773 (1941).
,6 PROSSER, TORTS 773 (1941)
,23 Ky L. Rep. 1941, 66 S.W 512 (1902)
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the cause for a new trial, the court expressly adopted the loss-of-
bargain rule that damages are the difference between the value of
the estate purchased and the value as represented, saying:
Appellants are entitled to what they were induced
to believe they were getting by their purchase. If they
actually received less 4han they were induced to believe
they were purchasing, they were damaged. If they were
induced to believe they were getting a bargain, it is no
answer to say they got the value of their money; they
are entitled to the bargain, the profit actually repre-
sented to exist."'
Judge O'Rear vigorously dissented and maintained that the
measure of damages should be the difference between the value of
that received and the contract price, and that anticipatory profits
were not to be included. Judge O'Rear relied upon the Kentucky
case of Campbell v. Hillman" as sustaining his view. However, the
chief problem facing the court in that case was not whether the
value paid or the value represented was to be used as the criterion
but whether or not subsequent events could be shown in establishing
the value of the estate actually received.
In a majority of the cases there is no apparent difference in the
result obtained whichever rule is applied.' In others where the
factual situations would produce a different result if the loss-of-
bargain rule were applied the parties fail to seek any profit, their
concern being merely to recoup their losses. For example in the case
ot Gregory v. Forester2' the plaintiffs fraudulently represented the
amount of debts of a partnership, an interest of which they sold to
the defendants. In an action on the notes given for the purchase
price the defendants counterclaimed for cancellation of the notes in
question and recovery for the balance of their losses. The court in
permitting a recovery on the counterclainm said, "'Instead of suing
for the one-sixth interest of the undisclosed indebtedness, they
treated the note as having been paid and sought to recover only
the actual loss that they sustained in the transaction which accord-
ing to their proof, was much less than the amount they were en-
titled to recover.'"' A similar situation was presented in the recent
"8Drake v. Holbrook, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1941, 1944, 66 S.W 512, 513-
514 (1902).
" 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon.) 406 (1854).
'Dittcher v. Binkley, 251 Ky. 134, 64 S.W 2d 502 (1933) (loss-
of-bargam), Bunch v. Bertram, 219 Ky 848, 294 S.W 805 (1927)
(loss-of-bargain) McGuffin v. Smith, 215 Ky. 606, 286 S.W 884
(1926) (out-of-pocket), Larue v Barbee, 184 Ky. 354, 212 S.W 142
(1919) (loss-of-bargain), Ligon v Minton, 125 S.W 304 (Ky. 1910)
(out-of-pocket), Merkley & Son v. Phillips & Co., 21 Ky. L. Rep.
1040, 53 S.W 1037 (1899) (out-of-pocket) Exchange Bank of Ken-
tucky v. Gaitskill, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 532, 37 S.W 160 (1896) (loss-of-
bargain).
21 228 Ky. 201, 14 S.W 2d 755 (1929).
Gregory v. Forester, 228 Ky. 201, 204, 14 S.W 2d 755, 756
(1929).
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case of Shilling v. McCraw,' wherein the defendants fraudulently
represented stones to be diamonds having a value of $600, but winch
were in fact glass and had a value of but $6.00. Subsequently the
plaintiff had an opportunity to sell the stones for $700 at which time
the fraud was discovered. The plaintiffs brought an action for $600
and recovered $594, the court stating the rule to be the difference
between the value paid and the value received. However, here again
the victim did not seek to include loss-of-profit in the damages and
perhaps if the petition had sought $700, the court would have stated
the rule to permit such recovery A search of the cases has revealed
but one wherein the court seemed to decline to give profit where
sought, and it is based on a peculiar factual situation. In Green v.
George ' the lessor of a hotel fraudulently represented the condition
of the premises to the lessee. In an action for fraud the lessees sought
damages for loss of business but the court held that they were en-
titled only to such sum as would place the premises in the repre-
sented condition. The court did not state either of the rules but fol-
lowed the pronouncement of several cases involving realty that dam-
ages are the sum required to place the property in the condition as
represented.' Obviously in the ordinary case this rule would allow
for loss-of-profit and the basis of the court's decision is probably
proximate cause.
In summary, Kentucky seems to be dedicated to the loss-of-
bargain rule. Although there is language in many of the cases to the
effect that the rule is that "actual" loss is the amount of damages,
there is no decision, expressly disallowing loss of profits. The case
of Drake v. Holbrook in the absence of other authority is controlling.
The best solution to the problem would be a combination of the
two rules. Certainly where there is a contract between the parties to
the suit there is no objection to allowing the victim the profit of his
transaction for although the action is on the tort, it is a tort which
induced the making of a contract. In cases not involving a contract
where the representation is made with actual intent the victim should
also be allowed his bargain, while in such cases where the repre-
sentation is but negligently made, the defendant should be held only
to the extent that his negligence has harmed the other party. To state
the rule simply* Loss-of-bargain is the measure of damages to be
awarded one defrauded with the sole exception that if there is no
contract between the parties and there was no actualintent to de-
ceive on the part of the one making the representation" the. measure
shall be that which the one defrauded is out-of-pocket. Such a com-
pronse would work justice in all cases which would adequately
compensate for its lack of consistency.
JoHN J. HoPKiNs
'298 Ky. 783, 184 S.W 2d 97 (1944).
' 289 Ky. 833, 160 S.W 2d 364 (1942).
1Dittcher v. Binkley, 251 Ky. 134, 64 S.W 2d 502 (1933), Bunch
v. Bertram, 219 Ky 848, 294 S.W 805 (1927).
